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Abstract  This essay attempts to demonstrate, via 
surveying 10 classics in the history of rhetoric, that 
“ornament” collocated with rhetorical figures is widely 
viewed as inventional or argumentative, especially from 
ancient Greece to the Renaissance. Further, 5 
representative dictionaries illustrate that this term gives 
priority to useful function in and before the medieval time 
but turns increasingly aesthetic from the Enlightenment 
downwards. In a historical-linguistic perspective, the 
semantic change of “ornament” is discovered to involve 
two tendency types: “Narrowing” and “Pejoration”, which 
can be attributed to psychological or cognitive factors, 
cultural impact and language contact. This rectification of 
“ornament” justifies from etymology and history of 
rhetoric that rhetorical figures, deserving a fairer repute, 
are indeed our flashing argumentative equipment.  
Keywords  Ornament, Argumentative, Rhetorical 
Classics, Etymology, Historical Linguistics 
1. Introduction
Figures of speech, whether tropes or schemes, are often 
disdained as playing the flowery role of 
ornament/adornment/embellishment, since these terms 
most frequently appear both in classics and textbooks 
throughout the history of rhetoric. True, they do often show 
up, but a close examination of some representative works 
before the 19th century will reveal that the meaning of these 
terms is far less confined to the modern stereotypical 
interpretation. This rectification of “ornament” is not 
without significance, as it will prove from the rhetorical 
tradition itself that figurative language, our flashing 
argumentative equipment, deserves a much fairer judgment 
and reputation.  
We will start with a brief account of the previous 
scholarships attending to this phenomenon before 
conducting a rather elaborate survey of no less than 10 
landmarks from the Greco-Roman, down the Middle Ages, 
the Renaissance, and to the early Enlightenment. Their 
typical interpretations or illustrations of “ornament” will be 
scrutinized for comparative or interrelated analyses, 
followed by a historical linguistic approach to tracing the 
laws and possible causes of this term’s semantic change. 
As mentioned, in addition to “ornament”, there are 
several synonyms appearing frequently in the English 
versions of the rhetorical classics. Comparatively speaking, 
“ornament” possesses the richest semantic dimensions, 
covering all the meanings of the others, as shown in The 
Oxford English Dictionary and Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary. And in the first English Rhetoric 
book, Thomas Wilson’ s The Arte of Rhetorique (1553),
one type of figures is named “ornaments”, so we choose 
this term as our major object of examination, while 
occasionally using its synonyms, due to the translated 
versions. And “argumentative”, is meant here as 
contributing to “the communicative process of advancing, 
supporting, criticizing, and modifying claims so that 
appropriate decision-makers, defined by relevant spheres, 
may grant or deny adherence.”1 
2. Previous Scholarship
The striking contrast between the classical and the 
modern “ornament” has been noticed by quite a few 
observant rhetoricians. Sister Joseph, in her ground-laying 
work on figures, surveys briefly the logical association of 
“ornament” in the Renaissance and before. She finds that to 
Aristotle, “Ornament is attained by induction and 
distinction of things” (Topics, 8. I. I 57 a 7), to Hermogenes, 
enthymemes are “embellishments”, to Cicero, “ornament 
apart from thought involves an unnatural separation”, and 
to Renaissance authors, figures of thought are “ornamentes 
of matter”（1947, pp. 39-40）. Walter Ong, in examining 
Renaissance rhetoric represented by Ramus, notices that 
“the first meaning of ornamentum in Latin…is equipment 
1 This definition of “argumentation” is offered by Rieke, R. D. & Sillars 
M. O. in Argumentation and Critical Decision Making (5th ed., New York: 
Longman, 2001, p. 2). After examining various definitions on this term, 
we find that Rieke & Sillars’ is more comprehensive, and thus its 
corresponding adjective can be more interpretative in our context. 
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or accoutrements” and offers two typical examples: “the 
fifteenth century can conceive of the hand as ‘a great help 
and ornament to the body,’ and the sixteenth century of 
tackling as the ‘ornaments of a ship.’” (1958, p. 277). Ong 
also mentions a neglected dimension of this notion as 
“praise” or “honor” or “light” (ibid: 278) of speaking, 
which, inherited from Cicero and Quintilian, still exists in 
the Renaissance time. Dyck (1966, p. 88) discovers that in 
the 17th century German rhetorical books, “ornatus” is 
meant “Wirkung” (effect/function), employed to arouse the 
audience’s emotions. Kennedy in Quintilian touches upon 
the Roman understanding of “ornament”, “a vital and 
useful quality”, which “suggests distinction and excellence, 
the possession of resources ready for any challenge” (1969, 
p. 81). In the same year, Griffin, with reference to Cicero,
Quintilian and Ong (1958), also realizes the complexity of 
this term. In commenting on Du Bellay’s debt to rhetoric, 
he reveals that “poetic ornaments” should be “constructs 
for a varied poetic affect that one can roughly identify, not 
just in ornamenting verse at random or in having static 
embellishments” (1969, p. 49). Ornament here is 
considered to be functional in triggering emotions rather 
than sheer decoration; besides, he also notices its other 
functions in Du Bellay’s Defence et Illustration, “in 
numerous instances the meaning of ornament extends to 
enhanced personal qualities and thought itself” (ibid: 48), 
where this notion is also linked unmistakably to ethos and 
logos. In the past three decades, a continuing attention lasts, 
though not with many rhetoricians. Vickers (1988, p. 314) 
points out the sharp contrast between the Roman 
weapon-like “ornatus” and the English “‘ornament’, with 
the unfortunate connotation of ‘adornment’, the use of 
unnecessary trappings or incidental decoration.” 
Fahnestock in her landmark work (1999) claims, “The 
Latin ornamentum also means furniture, apparatus, and 
equipment, so that ‘ornament’ may be more closely related 
to the notion of essential gear or ‘armament’ than it is to 
adornment.” (p. 18) She cites supporting examples in 
Rhetorica and Herennium, Henry Peacham and Martianus 
Capella’s works as evidence of this weapon dimension. 
These researches, with suggestive traces or proofs, have 
contributed to the awareness of the complex semantics of 
“ornament”. However, almost all of them cover this issue 
rather briefly, with several lines or paragraphs in passing; 
no treatises seem to have been published solely on this 
topic yet. The proofs shown above are still meager and 
mainly confined to a few classics in the Roman and 
Renaissance periods. So we feel that this topic needs to be 
systematically inquired to provide adequate evidence for 
the argumentative dimension of “ornament”, and to 
interpret or account for its semantic change in the rhetorical 
history. These two objectives are what we mainly attempt 
to fulfill, with the hope that this exploration will help 
rectify the overwhelming decorative dimension of 
“ornament”, and moreover, set its collocated rhetorical 
figures (tropes and schemes)--further free from their 
narrow unfair cage. 
3. Evidence from Rhetorical Classics
(Ancient Greece to the 18th C) 
The following will examine at least two classics in each 
period of our surveying span, except for the Enlightenment 
in which we are able to find just one representative. With 
regard to the Greek works as early as Gorgias’s, we 
surprisingly discover that “adornment” in The Encomium 
of Helen almost stands for the core or essence of the 
described, as apparently shown in the quasi-poetic English 
translation (with the original format) by Dillon & Gergel 
(2003, p. 76)： 
[I] The adornment (kosmos2) of a city is manpower, 
Of a body, beauty, 
Of a soul, wisdom,  
Of an action, virtue, 
Of a speech, truth; 
And the opposites of these make for disarray (akosmia).3 
Here, in addition to beauty, “adornment” is also regarded 
as functioning “wisdom”, “virtue”, or “truth”, etc., the 
most essential of its subject, being so hugely different from 
the present day interpretation.4 
Gorgias is not the only astonishing Greek. Isocrates’ 
Against the Sophists actually offers us similar evidence (in 
Norlin’s translation): 
But to choose from these elements those which 
should be employed for each subject, to join them 
together, to arrange them properly, and also, not to 
miss what the occasion demands but appropriately 
to adorn the whole speech with striking thoughts 
and to clothe it in flowing and melodious 
phrase--these things, I hold, require much study 
and are the task of a vigorous and imaginative 
mind… (1929, pp. 173-5)  
In this passage, “adorn” need be understood as 
“highlight”, or “striking thoughts” as “ornaments of the 
whole speech”, which indeed resembles Gorgias’ “truth” as 
“the adornment of a speech”. We can thereafter conclude 
that Isocrates’ “adorn [ment]” concerns no less essence of 
2 According to OED, “cosmos" in Greek has one meaning of “ornament” 
(Simpson & Weiner 1989, III, p. 986).  
3 George Kennedy’s version: “I. What is becoming to a city is manpower, 
to a body beauty, to a soul wisdom, to an action virtue, to a speech truth, 
and the opposites of these are unbecoming.” (Bizzell & Herzberg, 2001, p. 
44) Here, “What is becoming”, though phrased differently, is similar to
“Ornament” in meaning. 
4 We find a similar case in Lucan’s Pharsalia (VII., of Brutus): 
Oh, ornament of the empire, last hope of the Senate, 
Latest offspring of a family glorious in history, 
Rush not so rashly into the enemy’s center lines— 
Seek not to hasten the fates not due till Philippi 
And to forestall your own Thessalia. Nor will your plan 
‘Gainst Caesar’s life here count for aught; Not yet has he  
Attained a tyrant’s power. (as cited in Alberic, 1973, p. 152) 
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the matter.5 
The Roman classics can provide us with further proofs. 
[Cicero]’s Rhetorica ad Herennium, the first systematic 
work on figures of speech, illuminates the argumentative 
“exornationem” (ornament/embellishment) in the 
following paragraphs: 
The most complete and perfect argument, then, is 
that which is comprised of five parts: the 
Proposition, the Reason, the Proof of the Reason, 
the Embellishment, and the Résumé. … 
Embellishment we use in order to adorn and enrich 
the argument, after the Proof has been established. 
(1981, pp. 107-109) 
Here, “Embellishment” (“exornationem” in Latin origin), 
is itself a component of argument, and this 
argument-oriented adorning is even more explicitly 
illustrated in “Embellishment consists of similes, examples, 
amplifications, previous judgments, and the other means 
which serve to expand and enrich the argument” (ibid: 141). 
This tune of embellishment is resonated down through6 till 
the ending chapter of the entire work: 
I have here carefully collected all the principles of 
embellishing style. If, Herennius, you exercise 
yourself diligently in these, your speaking will 
possess impressiveness, distinction, and charm. As 
a result you will speak like a true orator, and the 
product of your invention will not be bare and 
inelegant, nor will it be expressed in commonplace 
language (ibid: 409). 
In these lines, we see at least three functions mentioned 
as generated by “embellishing” or “adorning”: 
“impressiveness, distinction, and charm” with the two 
more argumentative roles going before and they are all 
intended to serve the purpose of “invention” or argument. 
Bearing similarity to Isocrates, though not so sharp as 
Gorgias, the author of ad Herennium definitely charts a 
broad span for his notion of embellishment/ornament.  
His Roman follower, Quintilian, seems to offer a clearer 
picture for this term. In The Institutio Oratoria, he hails 
“ornament” as “flashing weapons”, which “appeals to the 
5 We also find that Aristotle treats in Topica (related to his Rhetoric) 
“ornament” and “adorn” in a like manner: “...for ornament, you should 
employ induction and the distinction of things of a closely similar kind. 
What induction is, is obvious; distinction is attained by statements such as 
that one science is better than another, either because it is more exact or 
because it is concerned with better objects, and that some sciences are 
theoretical, others practical and others creative. Every distinction of this 
kind helps to adorn your argument, though its introduction is not 
necessary to the conclusion.” (VIII, I, translated by E. S. Forster) This is 
taken from Posterior Analytics, Topica (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1960, pp. 685-7). 
6  There appears an ambivalent resonation in distinguishing types of 
figures (IV. XIII): “To confer distinction upon style is to render it ornate, 
embellishing it by variety. The divisions under Distinction are Figures of 
Diction and the Figures of Thought. It is a figure of diction if the 
adornment is comprised in the fine polish of the language itself. A figure 
of thought derives a certain distinction from the idea, not from the words.” 
(1981, p. 275) But in his illustration of the figures of diction, 
argumentative functions show up not infrequently. 
enthusiastic approval of the world at large” (BVIII. III. 2-6; 
1921, Vol. 3, p. 213). And these ornament weapons fulfill 
at least three interrelated tasks:  
The ornate is something that goes beyond what is 
merely lucid and acceptable. It consists firstly in 
forming a clear conception of what we wish to say, 
secondly in giving this adequate expression, and 
thirdly in lending it additional brilliance, a process 
which may correctly be termed embellishment. 
(ibid: 60-63; p. 245)  
Briefly put, the tasks or functions in his definition of 
“[t]he ornate” are to achieve clarity of thought, adequacy in 
expression, and embellishment or brilliance. So we see that 
in Quintilian’s many-layered semantics of “ornament”, the 
narrow sense of “embellishment”, though rather 
outstanding, occupies one third of it, at most.  
In the Medieval time, the Venerable Bede (c. 673-735)’s 
De schematibus ET tropis (Concerning Figures and Tropes 
c.700), England’s first treatise on Style, provides us with 
more traces of the argumentative “ornament/ 
embellishment”. Before specifying his 17 schemes and 28 
tropes, he generalizes their functions as follows (Bede, 
1973, p. 97): 
It is quite usual to find that, for the sake of 
embellishment, word order in written compositions 
is frequently fashioned in a figured manner 
different from that of ordinary speech. The 
grammarians use the Greek term “schema” for this 
practice, whereas we correctly label it a “manner,” 
“form,” or “figure,” because through it speech is in 
some way clothed or adorned. Metaphorical 
language is also quite commonly found when, 
either from need or for adornment, a word’s 
specific meaning is replaced by one similar but not 
proper to it. (tran. G. H. Tannenhaus) 
Here in describing the functions of both figures/ 
schemes and tropes, Bede uses “embellishment” and 
“adornment”, which at first glimpse seem rather decorative; 
however, a further check of his illustration (as shown in 
Periphrasis) gives us a clearer picture: 
Periphrasis is a circumlocution, and is used either 
to embellish and expand a simple idea or to avoid 
the direct mention of an unpleasant subject. An 
example of Periphrasis used to embellish a simple 
idea is the following (II Cor. 5:1): For we know that 
if the earthly house of our tabernacle be dissolved, 
we have a building from God, a house not made 
with hands, eternal in the heavens. (ibid: 112) 
In this context at least, Bede’s “embellish” collocated 
with “idea” is no other than “enrich” or “extend”, which is 
apparently argumentative. And his typical example of 
“Periphrasis” leaves us with no doubt. 
The Italian Alberic of Monte Cassino’s Flores rhetorici/ 
 
                                                          
214 Rhetorical Figures: The Argumentative “Ornament”  
 
Flowers of Rhetoric (c.1087),7 provides us with no less 
forceful evidence. The beginning of Chapter 5 where he 
starts to concentrate on the discussion of figures shows us 
some rather obvious traces. 
Let us move on, then, to that which enhances 
propriety and embellishes the composition. Let us, 
I mean, move on to those techniques which good 
Latin usage recognizes as figures. Granted that they 
are not of themselves necessary at all, yet by virtue 
of their own properties they add a degree of nobility, 
since they enhance, develop, improve, and illumine 
good style. 
First, adornment is added to a piece of writing in 
this way, when an idea is repeated for effect in one 
sentence. This will be clear in an example (Vergil, 
Aeneid X.149):  
He approaches the king; he makes known to the 
king his name and his family. (Alberic, 1973, p. 
143) 
In the above paragraphs, we see “embellish [ment]” and 
“adornment” play the ethotic function of adding “a degree 
of nobility” as well as the logical function of effectively 
repeating “an idea”, two major persuasive appeals in 
Aristotle’s invention. Apart from them, we also discover 
the apparent function of pathos generated by figures as 
shown below:  
No less attention should be given to seeing that the 
style is touched up, as it were, by certain little 
flourishes. Whenever an idea is presented in this 
way, when a suggestion of these touches is applied, 
a writer can emphasize what is good, guide the wise 
with his advice…he can oppose the arrogant, he 
can console the wretched. Moreover, he can love, 
praise and extol virtue, detest, spurn, and totally 
disavow the vices. (ibid: 151) 
To Alberic, the application of “touches”/ornaments via 
“flourishes”/figures not only fulfills the logical and ethical 
functions of guiding soundly and judging morally, but can 
also effectively tame strong emotions, such as “oppos[ing] 
the arrogant”, and “consol[ing] the wretched”. 
Thomas Wilson (1524-1581) of the Renaissance has 
shown us still stronger evidence. In The Art of Rhetoric 
(1553), while discussing the three types of figures: tropes, 
schemes, and colours, he unquestionably mentions the 
inventional or argumentative functions as manifest in 
explaining the last figure type--colours: 
[T]he third is when by diversity of invention a 
sentence is many ways spoken, and also matters are 
amplified by heaping examples, by dilating 
arguments, by comparing of things together, by 
7 According to its translator J. Miller, it is “the first work formally linking 
the ancient art of discourse and the new art of correspondence”(ibid: 131). 
similitudes, by contraries, and by divers other like, 
called by Tully exornation of sentences or colors of 
rhetoric. (1994, pp. 195-6) 
When illustrating his third type of figures, Wilson also 
uses “Ornaments” (ibid: 203) to refer to it.8 And we find 
that almost all of his 36 ornaments are no other than 
argumentative strategies or means, such as “Resting upon a 
Point”, “Witty Jesting”, “Digression”, “Proposition”, 
“Correction”, “Example”, “Fables”, etc. In their illustration, 
he repeatedly uses the terms like “augment” and 
“persuade”. For instance, Correction--altering the 
expression other than the previous--purposes “thereby to 
augment the matter and to make it appear more vehement” 
(ibid: 211). In terms of “Example” and “Fables”, Wilson 
stresses respectively, “He that mindeth to persuade must 
needs be well stored with examples.”; and “For not only 
they delight the rude and ignorant, but also they help much 
for persuasion.” (ibid: 215, 221) Actually, the 
argumentative function is not confined to the figure type of 
colours, but pervasive as well in his discussions of the other 
two types (tropes & schemes). So Peter Medine, the editor 
of the modernized version, concludes in the “Introduction” 
that “He [Thomas Wilson] almost never analyzes the 
figures specifically in terms of ornament [the narrow sense 
at the present time] or decoration.” (1994, p. 22)  
Wilson’s contemporary, Henry Peacham, does not write 
without similar remarks. In The Garden of Eloquence 
(1577), “[t]he greatest English work on the figures” 
(Fahnestock, 1999, p. 13), it is quite common for us to see 
“ornament” and its synonyms in Peacham’s description of 
the figures; a case in point is Antithesis:  
This is a most excellent ornament of eloquence, 
serving most aptly to amplification, it graceth and 
bewtifieth the Oration with pleasant varietie, and 
giveth singular perspicuitie and light by the 
opposition, it is so general that it may serve to 
amplifie and garnish any grave and weightie cause. 
(1593, p. 161) 
Here, “ornament” not only plays the function of gracing 
and beautifying, but also of achieving perspicuity and 
amplification to which it serves “most aptly”. The last 
clause unmistakably shows us that this ornament of 
antithesis plays the two combined roles of “amplif[ying] 
and garnish[ing]”, the desirable two-in-one effect. 
In the late Renaissance, Bernard Lamy (1640-1715) in 
his De L’Art de Parler／The Art of Speaking (1675), time 
and again employs the term “Ornament” with the 
argumentative dimension. As shown in Part 2, Chapter 2, 
8 Wilson’s division of the figures, besides Tully, may also be influenced 
by Melanchthon’s Elementorum Rhetorices Libri Duo (1534), as within 
the latter’s schemes, there is a subtype called “figures of ornament”, but 
due to the lack of its English version, we don’t know the specifics of its 
discussion. According to Medine’s related comment, for Melanchthon, 
“the argumentation and adornment of eloquent statement become virtually 
one” (Wilson, 1994, p. 13).  
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Section 3 is entitled “Tropes are an Ornament to 
Discourse”, for which he illustrates: 
Tropes do make a sensible description of the thing 
we intend: When we call a Great Captain The 
Thunderbolt of War, the Idea of Thunder informs 
pleasantly with what force, with what swiftness, 
with what noise, the said Captain overcomes: Men 
do not commonly receive any thing into their 
Minds, that comes not first to their Senses.9  
This remark compels us to feel that, to Lamy, the trope 
ornament should mainly function as vivaciously conveying 
the intended meaning, a kind of argumentative function.10 
In fact, he is strongly against the abuse of the ornament 
“introduc’d only for Imbellishment” (Harwood, 1986, p. 
334), so in “Of Artificial Ornaments: Rules relating to 
those Ornaments” (Part 4, Ch. 4, Section 3), he sets four 
strict rules: “apply them in their due time and place”; “the 
Ornaments be just”; “consider first what is useful”; “keep a 
just Moderation in our Ornaments” (ibid: 334-6). Among 
them, the first consideration of ornaments’ usefulness 
deserves our particular attention. Lamy’s sharp 
argumentative sense of figures is further displayed in these 
summarizing lines: 
For my own part I value not the Art of Speaking, 
but as it contributes to the discovery of truth; as it 
forces it from the bottom of our thoughts where it 
lay conseal’d; as it disentangles it, and displays it to 
our eyes; and indeed this is the true cause that has 
incouraged me to write of this Art, as a thing not 
only useful, but necessary. (ibid: 337) 
Far beyond being decorative, Lamy’s “Art of Speaking”, 
“Ornaments”/Figures (in this context), is definitely 
inventional or argumentative, due to its strong powers of 
discovering, revealing, disentangling, and displaying— 
“truth”. 
The plainness-oriented Enlightenment is actually a 
turning point of attitudes towards rhetorical figures. We 
find it hard to locate typical works with similar conception 
on “ornament”, but at least Hugh Blair’s Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1783) still displays certain 
traces. The Scottish rhetorician, treating figures as “the 
ornament of Style” (1819, p. 263), emphasizes that of all 
their four functions, 11 the most prominent is giving us 
frequently a much clearer and more striking view of the 
9 This is taken from 1676 English version, edited and noted by Harwood 
(1986, p. 222)，so the language bears Renaissance English character, e.g. 
capitalization for nouns here and spellings different from now, such as 
“incouraged” in the following citation.  
10 To be specific, the trope here contributes to the advancing of the claim 
that the captain is of extreme valour; the following quotation illustrates the 
similar argumentative function (cf. Note 1). 
11 The other three functions appear in Volume One, Lect. XIV are: “First, 
They enrich Language, and render it more copious….Secondly, They 
bestow dignity upon Style….In the third place, Figures give us the 
pleasure of enjoying two objects presented together to our view, without 
confusion; the principal idea, which is the subject of the discourse, along 
with its accessory, which gives it the figurative dress.” (1819, pp. 275-7) 
principal object, than we could have if it were expressed in 
simple terms, and divested of its accessory idea. This is, 
indeed, their principal advantage, in virtue of which, they 
are very properly said to illustrate a subject, or to throw 
light upon it. (ibid: 277)  
So to Blair, the ornaments of figures, though not without 
their beautifying effect as shown in other functions, need to 
fulfill, above all, an inventional or argumentative duty of 
illustrating or lighting up a subject; as a result, “even 
conviction is assisted, and the impression of a truth upon 
the mind made more lively and forcible” (ibid: 278). But 
maybe influenced by the Enlightenment Movement, his 
Belles Lettres occasionally shows traces of degrading the 
figure/ ornament as well.12  
The above survey is by no means exhaustive; it only 
concerns the classics written in or translated into English. 
We actually have detected certain clues in some 
non-English works, such as Melanchthon’s Elementorum 
Rhetorices Libri Duo (1534), Bouhours La manière de bien 
penser (1687), and Mayans’ Retórica (1757),13 but being 
unable to find their English versions, we have to give them 
up for this investigation. Moreover, even for the English 
source, we are far from making a thorough speculation of 
the related classics for all the convincing evidence. Yet, 
what we have provided can justify the conclusion that in a 
long historical time, especially from Ancient Greece to the 
Renaissance, “ornament” as inventional or argumentative 
is widely accepted and commonly held with a considerable 
prestige, almost incredible to the modern minds. 
4. Etymological Proofs from 
Dictionaries 
Besides the encouraging evidence from the rhetorical 
classics, widely acclaimed dictionaries may serve as a 
complementary source for traces in etymology. The 
following will closely examine five representative 
dictionaries, three comprehensive and two specialized, to 
detect both the functional trace of our “ornament” and the 
evolutionary track of its semantic change. 
In The Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed.), there list 
three meaning groups of “ornament”; examined here are 
all the “a” meanings for each group. Meaning 1. a. “Any 
adjunct or accessory (primarily for use, but not excluding 
decoration or embellishment); equipment, furniture, attire, 
trappings.” Analyzing this first of the first meanings, we 
see unmistakably that being useful is the most prominent 
function (though the accessory may be decorative as well). 
12 But Blair’s other remarks may sound rather ambivalent, such as 
“Figurative Language, over and above, bestows a particular dress upon 
that idea; a dress which both makes it to be remarked, and adorns it (ibid：
265).” And “The Figure is only the dress; the Sentiment is the body and 
the substance (p. 267).” 
13 Cf. Conley, Thomas. Rhetoric in the European Tradition (1990, pp. 199, 
209) for D. Bouhours and G. Mayans respectively. 
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OED offers examples from the years of 1225-1747. As the 
early ones are in Latin or old English, we select two 
examples in the Renaissance: “1565-73. The tackling or 
ornaments of a ship”; “1611 CHAPMAN Iliad XI. 450 A 
surgeon is to be preferr’d, with physic ornaments, before a 
multitude.” (Simpson & Weiner 1989, X, p. 939) The 
“ornaments” in these two are definitely more functional 
than decorative; in either case, they are actually 
equipment of utter necessity. However, the next two 
meanings, in brief, are decoration-oriented: Meaning 2. a. 
“Something employed to adorn, beautify, or embellish, or 
that naturally does this” (examples given from 1388-1969); 
and Meaning 3. a. “The action of adorning or fact of being 
adorned” (examples starting from 1596). In these two 
meanings, the interpretive “adorn”, or “embellish” is 
equivalent to “beautify”, different from what we have 
examined in the above classics. It is no wonder, then, that 
modern English “ornament” is associated so tightly with 
the narrow sense of adornment or embellishment. 
This tendency of the usefulness of “ornament” 
gradually giving way to embellishment is strongly felt in 
Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language. 
In its similar 3 meanings on “ornament”, we discover with 
no less surprise that the order is in complete reversal of 
the above: “1. Embellishment; decoration.”; “2. something 
that embellishes.”; “3. Honour; that which confers dignity.” 
(1827, II, p. 15) Here, the two meanings concerning 
beautification are treated as more prominent or popular; 
and this should be the case in Johnson’s 18th century 
British English. Not long after, American English displays 
its similar tendency. In Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary (originating from 1828) 14 , although the 
sequencing of the meanings is the same as that in OED, 
the first meaning--“a useful accessory”--is labeled as 
“archaic” (Gove, 2002, p. 1592), which implies its 
insignificance for current English. All these dictionaries, 
one way or another, offer us certain traces of the semantic 
evolution of “ornament”, from being mainly useful to 
almost entirely beautifying.  
The specialized Chambers Dictionary of Etymology, the 
most elaborate of its kind we can find, will provide us 
with further clues of period for each dominant meaning. It 
shows that the first meaning (“useful accessory”) is 
prevalent “[p]robably before 1200” with the spelling of 
“urnement”, and this meaning survives in the Renaissance, 
but in the meantime, decoration or embellishment exists 
side by side with it all through the periods, while the last 
meaning (“act of ornamenting”) appears rather late, to be 
specific, “first recorded in English in 1860, in J. S. Mill’s 
writings” (Barnhart 1966: 737). So we guess that the 
appearance of the last meaning might be a turning point of 
narrowing the inclusive equipment-centered “ornament” 
14 According to Philip Gove’s “Preface”, this is “the eighth in a series 
which has its beginning in Noah Webster’s American Dictionary of the 
English Language, 1828” (2002, p. 4a).  
to mere adornment which is expected to be more beautiful 
than useful. The more recent The Oxford Dictionary of 
Word Histories, though not so elaborate, provides us with 
extra clues: 
Ornament [Middle English] Early use included 
the sense ‘accessory’. It comes from Old French 
ournement, from Latin ornamentum ‘equipment, 
ornament’, from ornare ‘to adorn’. The verb dates 
from the early 18th century. (Chantrell, 2002, p. 
355) 
Here, we see this term’s family history: from Latin to 
Old French to Middle English, then modern English. Its 
first origin is Latin “ornamentum” which includes both 
“equipment” and “ornament” (maybe in the decorative 
sense). At the early English in the Middle Ages, it retains 
the meaning of “accessory”/“equipment”, the functional 
dimension. But the entry seems to imply that its later use 
gradually loses this sense. 
We thus have the reason to conclude, in combination 
with what we have proved previously, that at least before 
the 13th century, “useful accessory” is a widely accepted 
(possibly dominant) semantic dimension for “ornament”, 
and around the Renaissance time which has been much 
influenced by the Greco-Roman period, this first meaning 
has been basically maintained and not lost until around the 
nineteenth century. 
5. Historical Linguistic Interpretation 
With the semantic changes of “ornament” proved by 
both the classics and dictionaries, come our further 
inquiries--whether there are interpreting laws behind it and 
why such a change has happened. Historical linguistics, 
dealing with all sorts of language change, appears the most 
promising approach to solving our curiosities. As to 
semantic change in particular, various change types have 
already been justified, of which we prefer the rather terse 
summary by Fortson (2003): “Metaphoric extension”, 
“Metonymic extension”, “Broadening”, “Narrowing”, 
“Melioration”, “Pejoration”. 15 The semantic change of 
“ornament” seems to have displayed the law of narrowing 
as well as certain pejoration (tending to be more negative). 
For either of the two laws, we see similar cases to our 
“ornament”. With the narrowing of meaning, for example, 
in old English “deor” refers to “animal” in general, not 
merely “deer”, and “corn” means “grain”, not confined to 
“maize” or “oats” (Traugott & Dasher, 2002, p. 56); with 
the negative tendency, for instance, “mistress’’ undergoes 
15 These 6 change types summarized by Fortson are taken from “Table 1. 
Classifications of types of semantic change from a sociolinguistic point of 
view” in Crespo (2013, p. 81), actually an echoing of the classification in 
Michel Bréal’s pioneering work, Essai de Semantique (1897): “pejoration 
vs. amelioration, restriction vs. expansion, metaphor vs. metonymy” 
(cited in Traugott & Dasher, 2002, p. 54). 
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“head of household>woman in continuing extra-marital 
relationship with a man”, and “bourgeois”, the process of 
“resembling the French middle class>philistine”. 
“Ornament” not only experiences the reduction from the 
inclusive meaning of accessory both useful and beautiful 
to the mere beautifying decoration, but now it is also 
tinted, not infrequently, with some disdaining connotation. 
So we see that the semantic change of “ornament” is 
not a rare case in historical linguistics, yet it is a more 
complicated one (with two changes together). More 
significant, then, is how to account for this phenomenon. 
From Michel Bréal (1897) down to the present 
scholarship, generally two major types of causality have 
been mentioned: internal and external. The former mainly 
concerns the psychological and cognitive factors, such as 
avoiding difficulty, securing greater clarity; the latter 
involves social ones, e.g. political or cultural changes, and 
language contacts (cf. Crespo, 2013, p. 48; Traugott & 
Dasher, 2002, pp. 58-59). To the semantic change of 
“ornament”, we think both internal and external factors, 
and even the interaction of them, have made contributions. 
The original meanings of “ornament” are too inclusive 
and context-dependent, requiring extra attention for the 
mental or cognitive processing; by and by, the word tends 
to be assigned with fewer dimensions so as to play its role 
efficiently. Then why does the dimension of usefulness 
get more and more diminished, other than that of 
beautification? This could be explained from the external 
factors, mainly cultural or ideological impact, and 
language contact. We claim that the Enlightenment 
Movement, advocating utility and plain language, may be 
most responsible for the modern interpretation of 
“ornament”, especially when it is collocated with 
rhetorical figures.16 Descartes, Locke, Kant, to name just 
a few; have all severely attacked figurative language. 
Locke, in “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, 
bombards the most deadly shell, 
All the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, 
all the artificial and figurative application of 
words eloquence hath invented, is for nothing else 
but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions 
and thereby mislead the judgment; and so indeed 
are a perfect cheat. (France, 2006, p. 499) 
And not just individual philosophers, some academic 
societies as well have shown apparent contempt, even 
“indignation” at the ornaments, such as the British Royal 
Society, “Who can behold, without indignation, how 
many mists and uncertainties these specious tropes and 
figures have brought on our knowledge?” (ibid: 498) 
Under such critical shells and storms from both the 
16 This claim is still in lack of adequate evidence, as the learned peer 
reviewer pointed out, “language had been at the centre of a fiery debate for 
at least 200 years: the controversy about the language of Elizabethan 
playwrights or on the plain style in the XVII century was exactly centered 
on the figural aspects, on “rhetorical exhorbitancies” and on the illicit 
separation between words and things”. 
influential philosophers and the authoritative institutions, 
rhetorical ornaments are unfortunately pinned down to the 
superficial adorning business. Then in the following 
translation of the Greco-Roman rhetorical classics, the 
non-equivalent English “ornament” has to be used for the 
Latin “ornamentum”, leading the unfortunate readers to 
the severe misunderstanding of the original scope. This 
inevitable language contact, with the overwhelming power 
of the modern English, may have contributed still further 
to the restrictive and pejorative construal of the original 
concept. 
6. Conclusions 
With the chronological surveying of 10 classics, we have 
demonstrated that “ornament” collocated with rhetorical 
figures was widely viewed as argumentative or inventional, 
especially from ancient Greece downward to the 
Renaissance. The cross-referencing of 5 most 
representative dictionaries further illustrates that this term 
gives priority to useful function at least in and before the 
medieval time and that it appears to turn increasingly 
aesthetic from the Enlightenment onwards. According to 
historical linguistics, the semantic change of “ornament” 
involves two tendency types: “Narrowing” and 
“Pejoration”, which can be attributed mainly to cognitive 
(internal) and cultural (external) factors, and their possible 
interactions. This semantic change seems unavoidable and 
not without justification. We have to accept the destiny that 
today whenever we encounter “ornament”, at least for the 
vast majority, the first association is beautiful decoration, 
rather than being useful or inventional. However, since the 
functions of rhetorical figures have proved to be 
argumentative far beyond mere beautification, not only by 
the ancient classics cited above, but increasingly by 
modern and contemporary scholarships (e.g. Joseph, 1947; 
Fahnenstock, 1999; Kraus, 2007; Harris, 2013). So here are 
our ways out: we can either avoid collocating tropes and 
schemes with “ornament”, or add an attribute such as 
“argumentative”, “inventional”, “persuasive” before 
“ornament”--better even--with a more specific back 
modifier, such as “for ethos”, “for pathos”, or “for 
identification”. 
Acknowledgements 
We would like to thank very gratefully, University of 
London (SOAS, UCL, Warburg, etc.) and British Library, 
for providing all the precious references; Randy Allen 
Harris, Ines Tyson, Ming’an Luo and the meticulous peer 
reviewers, for benefiting this exploration in various ways. 
Further, this research has been generously supported by 
Jiangsu Government Scholarship for Overseas Studies 
(JS-2016-214) and Chinese National Social Science Fund 
Project: “On Argumentative Textual Functions of Major 
Tropes and Schemes” (15BYY178). 
 
                                                          




[1] Alberic of Monte Cassino. 1973. Flowers of Rhetoric. In 
Miller, Joseph, Prosser, Michael, & Benson, Thomas (eds). 
Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, pp., 131-161. 
[2] Barnhart, R. 1966. Chambers Dictionary of Etymology. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[3] Bizzell, P., & Herzberg, B. 2001. The Rhetorical Tradition: 
Readings from Classical Times to the Present. Boston: 
Bedford/St. Martin’s. 
[4] Blair, H. 1819. Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres 
(Vol. I, Thirteenth Ed.). London: Bibliolife. 
[5] Chantrell, G. 2002. The Oxford Dictionary of Word 
Histories. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
[6] [Cicero]. 1981. Rhetorica ad Herennium. Trans. Harry 
Caplan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
[7] Conley, T. 1990. Rhetoric in the European Tradition. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
[8] Crespo, B. 2013. Change in Life, Change in Language: A 
Semantic Approach to the History of English. Frankfurt: 
Peter Lang GmbH.  
[9] Dillon, J., & Gergel, T. 2003. The Greek Sophists. London: 
Penguin Books Ltd. 
[10] Dyck, J. 1966. Ticht-Kunst: Deutsche Barockpoetik und 
rhetorische Tradition. Bad Homburg: Max Niemeyer 
Verlag. 
[11] Fahnestock, J. R. 1999. Rhetorical figures in science. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
[12] France, P. 2006. Rhetoric. In The Cambridge History of 
Eighteenth-Century Philosophy (Vol. I), Haakonssen, 
Knud (ed.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
496-515. 
[13] Gove, P. B. 2002. Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary. Springfield: Merriam-Webster INC., 
Publishers. 
[14] Griffin, R. 1969. Coronation of the Poet: Joachim du 
Bellay’s Debt to the Trivium. Berkeley: University of 
California Press. 
[15] Harris, R. A. 2013. Figural Logic in Gregor Mendal’s 
“Experiments on Plant Hybrids”. Philosophy and Rhetoric 
46 (4), pp. 570-602. 
[16] Harwood, J. T. 1986. The Rhetorics of Thomas Hobbes 
and Bernard Lamy. Carbonale: Southern Illinois 
University Press. 
[17] Isocrates. 1929. Isocrates (II). Trans. George Norlin, 
London: William Heinemann LTD.  
[18] Johnson, S. 1827. A Dictionary of the English Language. 
London: Longman. 
[19] Joseph, M. 1947. Shakespeare’s Use of the Arts of 
Language. New York: Columbia University Press. 
[20] Kennedy, G. 1969. Quintilian. New York: Twayne 
Publishers, Inc. 
[21] Kraus, M. 2007. From Figure to Argument: Contrarium in 
Roman Rhetoric. Argumentation 21, pp. 3-19. 
[22] Ong, W. J. 1958. Ramus: Method and the Decay of 
Dialogue. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
[23] Peacham, H. 1593. The Garden of Eloquence. London: 
British Library. 
[24] Quintilian. 1921. The Institutio Oratoria. Trans. H. E. 
Butler. Vol. III. London: William Heinemann LTD.  
[25] Simpson, J. A., & Weiner, E. S. C. 1989. The Oxford 
English Dictionary. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
[26] The Venerable Bede. 1973. Concerning Figures and 
Tropes. In Miller, Joseph, Prosser, Michael, & Benson, 
Thomas (eds). Readings in Medieval Rhetoric. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 96-122. 
[27] Traugott, E., & Dasher, R. 2002. Regularity in Semantic 
Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
[28] Vickers, B. 1988. In Defence of Rhetoric. Oxford: 
Clarendon. 
[29] Wilson, T. 1994. The Art of Rhetoric (1560). University 
Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
 
 
